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Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the
Effect of Corporate Governance
Yair Listokin, Yale Law School
Empirical studies of corporate governance address potential endogeneity problems, but
fail to place endogeneity in the context of a model and ignore the possibility of disparate
treatment effects across companies. This paper tackles these defects. The model and
analysis in the paper demonstrate that: (1) Valid and positive estimates for the effect of
governance can only arise if there is random variation in governance and governance
is systematically underproduced, or governance is chosen randomly without bias and
the randomness under study concerns a subpopulation with below-average governance.
(2) Governance models that correct for endogeneity using subsamples of firms, fixed
effects, or instrumental variables estimates focus on subpopulations of companies
that may have different responses to a governance treatment than the average firm.
(JEL K22, G34)
Introduction
Corporate law and corporate finance have taken an increasingly empirical
turn. Law reviews and finance journals are replete with empirical studies
of the effect of corporate law or other sources of governance on corporate
performance. This is a good thing. Theoretical arguments about the value
of staggered boards or outside directors mean little without hard evidence
about the size of these costs and benefits.
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Interpreting Corporate Governance Estimates 91
However, these empirical studies only have value for policy to the extent
that empirical estimations provide unbiased and appropriately understood
estimates for the parameters of interest. Most prominently, the studies must
account for endogeneity problems. For example, companies with staggered
boards are different in many unobservable ways from companies without
staggered boards (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002; Bebchuk and
Cohen, 2005). It is therefore extremely difficult to attribute differences in
takeover probabilities associated with firms with and without staggered
boards to the staggered board, rather than some other factor. Many scholars
are aware of the endogeneity concern and take steps to address it (Daines,
2001; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005).
To this point, however, the treatment of endogeneity has been inadequate.1
There has been no model of the corporate governance process that carefully
specifies sources and effects of potential endogeneity problems. The absence
of a model has exacerbated another flaw of the corporate governance liter-
ature’s treatment of endogeneity. When firms respond to corporate law and
governance heterogeneously—i.e., when a governance mechanism affects
one firm differently from another—then the cures for endogeneity, such
as instrumental variables techniques, subsample estimates, or fixed-effects
estimators, generate estimates of the effect of various governance strate-
gies for a select group of firms. The relationship of the estimates derived
for these subgroups to the average treatment effect (ATE) of a policy is
the subject of an extensive literature in econometrics and labor economics
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman, Urzua,
and Vytlacil, 2006) that has to this point been ignored by the corporate
law and governance literature as well as in empirical legal studies, more
generally.
This paper addresses these flaws. By developing a model of governance,
the paper clarifies the successes and defects of the corporate governance
literature in estimating the impact of many levers of corporate governance.
The model allows us to specify the conditions under which scholars may
interpret empirical results as supporting conclusions, such as “corporate law
1. This paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of potential flaws
in corporate governance studies. For example, there is a rich literature discussing the
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involves a race to the bottom between states” or “staggered boards reduce
value.” The only way to credibly find a negative impact for a staggered board
is to find some variable that generates random variation in governance for a
set of firms that overuse staggered boards.
The model also provides a lever for interpretation of corporate gover-
nance estimates when firms respond to corporate law and governance het-
erogeneously. In many cases, the subpopulation of firms induced to change
governance by a random variable will be very different from the population
of interest for policy. For example, a firm that is induced to choose a stag-
gered board by some accident of history may well have a different response
to a staggered board than the average firm, even after controlling for other
factors. The paper examines how this heterogeneity affects the interpreta-
tion of many popular corporate law and governance estimation techniques.
Instead of attempting to directly estimate the ATE for all firms, which is a
generally unattainable goal, the econometrics literature advocates estimates
local average treatment effects (LATE) or marginal treatment effects (MTE)
for several different subpopulations. When a proposed policy affects firms
with similar characteristics to those firms for whom a valid LATE has been
obtained, then extrapolation of the LATE estimates to estimate the policy
response deserves greater credence than general extrapolations of LATE to
very different populations (Imbens, 2007a).
Estimating Treatment Effects in Corporate Governance
Treatment Effects Framework
Most empirical studies seek to determine the “treatment effect” of a
certain treatment variable on another variable of policy interest (Angrist,
2007). For example, a study examining staggered boards would search for the
treatment effect of having a staggered board on the value of the company, or
on the probability that the company will be taken over. Formally (following
Angrist, 2007), let Di be a dummy variable indicating whether company
i receives a treatment (e.g., a staggered board),2 let Y1,i be the outcome
variable of interest when the treatment is received, such as the value of
2. For simplicity, I focus on a discrete treatment variable. Most variables of interest
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company i with a staggered board, and let Y0,i be the outcome when the
treatment is not received, such as the value of company i without a staggered
board. The treatment effect on i is therefore Y1,i − Y0,i .
Treatment effects vary across experimental subjects. When this occurs,
the treatment effect is termed heterogeneous. The effect of a staggered
board on one company’s value differs from a staggered board’s effect on
another company’s value. Because it is generally difficult (or impossible) to
determine the treatment effect of a treatment for each experimental subject
(Y1,i − Y0,i cannot be known for each i because we only observe either Y1,i
or Y0,i for any i), researchers typically attempt to estimate the ATE for all
subjects in a population. The ATE can be expressed as E[Y1,i − Y0,i ], where
E is the mathematical expectation operator. In the staggered board context,
the empirical researcher seeks to determine the average effect of a staggered
board on corporate value. While the ATE is a frequently used parameter of
interest for the empirical researcher, the ATE is not always the parameter of
greatest interest. Some policy interventions effect subpopulations that may
respond differently to a treatment variable than the average population. For
example, if one is considering outlawing staggered boards, then the treatment
effect of interest is the effect of eliminating staggered boards for companies
that already have them (E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1]),3 since companies with
staggered boards are the only companies that will be affected by the policy
change. This effect (often called the average treatment effect on the treated or
ATET) may be different than the ATE. Indeed, we might think that firms that
choose staggered boards to be less negatively affected by staggered boards
than firms that reject staggered boards. Alternatively, one might suppose that
the only firms that destagger are those in which management is so entrenched
that the staggered board does not matter. In either case, the ATET differs
from the ATE. Another treatment effect of interest is the MTE, which is the
treatment effect of a variable for those on the margin of experiencing or not
experiencing the treatment. The MTE will also generally be different than
the ATE or ATET. For example, firms at the margin of having or not having
governance are discrete treatments. Similar conclusions, with more notational complexity,
apply when a continuous treatment variable is used.
3. This expression compares the value of a particular firm, when it has a staggered
board and under the counterfactual of taking the staggered board away, given that the firm
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a staggered board will be differentially affected by a staggered board than
the average firm (ATE) or the average firm that chooses the staggered board
(ATET).4
Corporate Governance Literature
Over the last decade, a series of important empirical articles have evalu-
ated the impact of many levers of corporate governance on firm value and
performance. The majority of these papers share an underlying empirical
methodology. They collect data on firm value and on corporate governance
measures and exploit variation in governance within and across companies to
measure governance’s effect on value. To illustrate, Daines (2001) regressed
Tobin’s q, a measure of value added by a firm, on state of incorporation and
a long list of control variables and found that Delaware law raises firm value
by 5–7 percent. These results were criticized by Subramanian, among others
(2004), who found that the Delaware effect disappeared in years following
Daines’ study and that alternative treatment of some variables reduced the
size of the Delaware effect.
Other studies attempt to determine the impact of staggered boards on
corporate value and performance (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian 2002;
Bebchuk and Cohen 2005).5 Bebchuk and Cohen find that staggered boards
are associated with a reduction in Tobin’s q by 15–20 percent (p. 423)
after controlling for many other factors. Still others attempt to measure
the aggregate value of all forms of governance. In one of the most well-
known studies, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) develop a composite
measure of governance that includes many aspects of governance, such
as the presence or absence of a poison pill, staggered board, and state
antitakeover statutes, among many others. They find that their composite
measure of governance is associated with an 8.5 percent increase in annual
returns. Many papers have attempted to refine, explain, or undermine the
Gompers, Ishii, Metrick results. (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004;
Chi, 2005; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Core, Guay, and Rusticus, 2006). For
4. See Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) for an illuminating discussion of different
treatment effects of interest.
5. Many other governance topics have been examined, including the effect of inde-
pendent directors on value (see studies reviewed in Bhagat and Black, 2002) and the effect
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example, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) show that the GIM results cannot
be attributed to incorrect investor expectations of the performance of well-
governed firms, while Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that the
bulk of the governance effects found in GIM can be attributed to just a few
governance variables, including staggered boards and poison pills.
If the estimates presented in these papers can be interpreted as treatment
effects, then academic research reveals that certain governance practices
have large positive effects on firm performance. This knowledge, if imple-
mented by corporations, could have enormous impacts on the economy. Few
areas of academic research can compete with discovering a treatment that
can improve firms’ annual returns by 8.5 percent. A careful examination of
these studies’ identification strategies is therefore warranted.
Returning to the staggered board example, the primary specification
would compare the value (e.g. Tobin’s q) of firms with and without stag-
gered boards. Formally, E[Yi |Di = 1] − E[Yi |Di = 0]. All of these papers,
however, realize that a simple comparison of values for firms with and with-
out staggered boards does not provide an accurate estimate of the treatment
effect of staggered boards. Firms choose whether to have a staggered board
or not. Therefore, firms with staggered boards may be systematically dif-
ferent than firms without staggered boards. Differences in value between
firms that have or do not have a staggered board may be due to the staggered
board, or they may be due to other systematic differences between the firms.
Formally,
[E[Yi |Di = 1] − E[Yi |Di = 0]] = [E[Y1,i |Di = 1] − E[Y0,i |Di = 0]]
= E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1] + {E[Y0,i |Di = 1] − E[Y0,i |Di = 0]}.
The difference in value between firms with and without staggered boards
is the sum of the ATET and a bracketed endogeneity effect, {E[Y0,i |Di =
1] − E[Y0,i |Di = 0]}, due to the fact that the average value of the type of
firms with staggered boards E[Y0,i |Di = 1] is different than the average
value of firms without staggered boards, and these values would be different
even if there were no such thing as staggered boards.
The papers are well aware of the endogeneity problem and respond in
various ways. Indeed, many of the papers under study use all of the tech-
niques described below to address endogeneity problems. To properly under-
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produces the observed variation in corporate governance is necessary. None
of the papers provides such a model. A simple framework is therefore devel-
oped below and applied to the corporate governance studies described above.
Models of Corporate Governance Decisions and Variations in
Corporate Governance
Consider a simple model of governance decisions. Suppose each unit
of governance, g, for company i yields net benefits bi (g). Assume that
b′i (0) > 0, meaning that going from no corporate governance to a small
amount has at least some benefits for all companies, and b′′i (g) < 0—there
are diminishing marginal returns on governance.





yielding the first-order condition b′i (g) = 0. Intuitively, a firm increases
governance until the marginal benefit of a unit of governance, b′i (g) is no
longer positive. Let g∗i denote the optimal governance level for firm i .
Even with this simple model of corporate governance, a number of obser-
vations are possible. First, if bi (g) = b j (g) for i = j , meaning that the net
benefits of governance are the same for all companies, then all companies
will have the same amount of governance, g∗, implying that there will be
no variation in governance choices. Because we observe variation in gov-
ernance, there must be something wrong with the model or the assumption
that bi (g) = b j (g).
Model I
One possibility is that governance is chosen through the model plus
some symmetric mean-zero random perturbation (εi ), gi = g∗ + εi . This
would occur if a firm is trying to choose the optimal governance arrange-
ment, but idiosyncratic disturbances prevent the firm from getting to this
amount. Under these assumptions, all deviations from the average level
of governance decrease value. For firms with below-average governance,
increases in governance increase value and for firms with above-average
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endogeneity bias, as the randomness of governance choices insures that
E[Y0,i |Di = 1] = E[Y0,i |Di = 0], or the continuous variable equivalent.
Thus, a simple comparison of outcomes across firms with different gover-





∗ + εi ).
Depending on the concavity or convexity of b′(g), the average treatment
effect can be positive, negative, or zero. This corresponds to the “mar-
ket efficiency” critique of corporate governance studies—if companies are
choosing governance to maximize value, the ATE of studies of governance
should be zero or near zero. Note, however, that a study examining variation
in the subset of firms with the least governance would find a positive effect of
governance and a study examining variation in firms with the most amount
of governance would find a negative effect of governance.
Model II
Another possibility is that governance choices are systematically biased
but vary randomly, that is gi = g∗ + εi , where εi is a random variable
with a positive or negative mean. This would occur if there remain idiosyn-
cratic features affecting the governance choice,6 but market participants
consistently overestimate or underestimate the value of governance, or other
factors, such as principal–agent problems or ignorance, systematically bias
governance choices. As in the case above, there is no endogeneity bias and a
simple outcome comparison produces an estimate of the average treatment
effect. If E[εi ] < 0 (governance choices are biased downward), then the
estimated treatment effects will be positive.7 Because average governance
choices are too low, more governance means higher asset values. A potential
explanation for the source of Model I or Model II variation is examined in
Model IV.
Model III
Alternatively (or additionally, all the models presented here may have
an element of truth), firms could differ in their governance maximization
6. If there is no random variation in governance but there is bias, then there will be
no variation with which to obtain treatment effects.
7. BCF (Cal. Law Review, 2002) argue that finding a positive effect implies that
there must be selection bias. This model shows otherwise. So long as there is a plausible
mechanism, biasing choices in one direction (e.g., ignorance or faulty expectations), then
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decisions. That is, bi (g) = b j (g). Different firms will have different needs
for different types of governance and it therefore should be no surprise that
what is optimal for one firm is not optimal for another. These differences in
governance maximization may or may not be correlated with other attributes
of the firm, e.g., firms in one industry may have more use for a staggered
board than firms in another industry. Under these conditions, there will be
variation in g across companies. Because firms are maximizing, the true
ATE should be zero—firms choose governance to maximize value. A simple
comparison of outcomes across treatments, E[Yi |Di = 1] − E[Yi |Di = 0]
with this data-generating process, however, does not recover the ATE. To
see this, suppose that bi (0) = b j (0) and b′i (g) ≥ b′j (g) for all g. Because
b′i (0) > 0 for all i and b
′′ < 0, this implies that g∗i > g
∗
j and that bi (g
∗
i ) >
b j (g∗j ). Thus, E[Yi |g = g∗i ] > E[Yi |g = g∗j ]. Intuitively, companies that
benefit from more governance will (in this model) be worth more than
companies that do not benefit, so comparing values across governance levels
will lead to a positive treatment-effect estimate, in spite of the fact that the
true ATE is zero—from company optimization. The endogeneity problem
rears its head.
Model IV
A fourth model requires the introduction of a new variable ci to al-
low for principal–agent problems. Let ci represent the costs of a unit of
governance to the manager and not the company, whose net benefits from
governance continue to be determined by bi (g). Assume that the manager
chooses governance to maximize her utility, which consists of the com-
pany’s value from governance plus her own costs ( maxgi bi (gi ) − ci gi ).
Without principal–agent problems, all companies would choose gi such
that b′i (gi ) = 0. Because of principal–agent problems (represented by ci ),
the company instead uses governance to solve b′(gi ) = ci .
In Model 4 with bi (g) = b j (g) for i = j , differential managerial aver-
sion to governance (variation in ci ) causes all variation in governance. There
will be heterogeneity in the effect of governance in spite of the fact that the
benefits of governance are the same for all companies. Attempts to identify
the ATE from variation in governance, E[Yi |Di = 1] − E[Yi |Di = 0] may
or may not be valid. The ATE estimate will be valid if ci , the manager’s
cost of a unit of governance, is uncorrelated with the value of the company.
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differences in value exclusively through b(gi ), allowing identification of
the ATE. If ci is distributed randomly across companies and has mean zero,
then Model IV is equivalent to Model I. If ci is distributed randomly across
companies and has a positive mean, then Model IV is equivalent to Model II.
If the costs of governance to the manager is correlated with corporate value,
a likely possibility given that governance might be more costly for bad man-
agers, then the ATE cannot be identified because E[Y0,i |Di = 1, low ci ] =
E[Y0,i |Di = 1, high ci ]. The estimate derived from simple comparison of
outcomes across treatments would be biased due to omitted variable bias.
This modeling exercise yields the following conclusions. Simple compar-
ison of outcomes for companies with different treatments, such as comparing
Tobin’s q for companies with and without staggered boards or Delaware in-
corporation, yields valid and positive estimates of true treatment effects only
if governance variation is random and governance is systematically under-
desired or if managerial differences in costs of governance are uncorrelated
with value of a corporation.8 All of these possibilities are difficult to be-
lieve, meaning that simple comparisons of value across governance choices
generally yield invalid estimates of treatment effects.
Interpreting Empirical Techniques for Estimating
the Effect of Governance
Although the empirical papers examined here do not develop a model of
the process generating the observed variation in governance choices, they
all appreciate the endogeneity problem. Indeed, most of the studies rely on
several techniques to mitigate the endogeneity bias problem.
Control Variables
All the studies presented above include a host of control variables in
a linear regression technique. The purpose of control variables is straight-
forward. While firms with staggered boards may be different than firms
without staggered boards, the difference between these firms may be
explainable by the linear impacts of other variables. In this case, we
8. This is not to say that there is no random variation in governance, but rather
that some of the variation is nonrandom. When there is some nonrandom variation, naive
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can “control” for other factors and thereby derive a valid estimate for
the treatment effect of a staggered board on firm value. Formally, even
though E[Y0,i |Di = 1] = E[Y0,i |Di = 0], E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ] may equal
E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β], permitting valid identification of the ATE.
It is unlikely that the addition of control variables solves the endo-
geneity bias problem. Model III demonstrates why. If heterogeneous firms
choose staggered boards to maximize value, then differential staggered board
choices by seemingly identical firms indicate that the firms are different. This
difference could be correlated with value, implying that E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ]
= E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β], and making inferences about the ATE derived from
cross-sectional variation in staggered boards invalid. Again, regressions may
find positive ATEs when there are none in truth.
It is possible that Model I or II applies after conditioning for control
variables, and that variation in staggered boards or other governance features
is random. Model I is plausible, but contradicts the results of most of these
studies by requiring an ATE near zero. Model II would allow valid inference
and generate positive ATEs. Model II, however, requires an explanation for
why, after controlling for other observed variables, governance choices (1)
vary randomly and (2) are systematically biased downward. Indeed, most
of the studies examined here make no such argument. Many of them (e.g.,
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) emphasize
that the cross-sectional results prove associations rather than causation.9
Future articles should make such an argument explicitly or place reduced
emphasis on their OLS findings.
If Model I or II applies after controlling for other variables, then het-
erogeneity of firms does not present a barrier for recovering a valid es-
timate of the average treatment effect on the treated. These models im-
ply that E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ] = E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β]. Thus, [E[Yi |Di =
1] − E[Yi |Di = 0]] = E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1], so heterogeneity of gover-
nance simply means that OLS estimates must be interpreted as average
causal effects on the treated group (ATET) (E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1]) rather
than universal causal effects ( Y1 − Y0).
9. The emphasis on association rather than causation, while justified, should not be
overstated. The papers have attracted the attention that they have because of the possibility
of causation and all the papers adduce some evidence that governance has a causal effect
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Treatment Effects for Select Groups of Firms
While the papers under study concede that endogeneity bias precludes
claims about the treatment effects of governance, many claim that treatment
effects can be estimated for certain subgroups of firms. The argument runs
as follows. At some point, some firms made governance choices that are
unrelated to the effects of these choices today. These choices then became
fixed, in spite of their positive impacts. Thus, the governance choices for
firms in this subsample originally corresponded to Model I, and with time
they may have become like Model II, allowing for valid identification of the
treatment effects of governance. For example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)
and Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) argue that the staggered
board choices of firms that went public long ago were chosen for some
reason unrelated to the effects of staggered boards today (after controlling
for other variables). Staggered boards are nearly impossible to create today.
Therefore, variation in staggered boards follows Model I or Model II, im-
plying that E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ,mature] = E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β,mature]
and allowing for identification of treatment effects. Daines makes a similar
argument with respect to Delaware incorporation in mature firms.
There are several problems with these analyses. First, the assumption
that old variations in staggered board status are exogenous with respect to
today’s value may simply be wrong. Presumably, old decisions were taken
according to Model III. While the parameters of Model III may have changed
over the intervening period, the original choice variable may be correlated
with unobserved variables today.
Second, the stickiness of old decisions that creates Model II like vari-
ation today may be an inappropriate assumption. As recognized by BCS
when critiquing Daines’ incorporation study, firms may change their state
of incorporation, implying that old decisions are not perfectly sticky. More-
over, firms that choose to change their old decision may be different
than firms that do not, reintroducing Model III or Model IV like het-
erogeneity into the data-generating process for old firms and implying
that E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ,mature] = E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β,mature]. If firms
with good executives change their states of incorporation to Delaware but
firms with bad executives do not, then comparing Delaware firms with
non-Delaware firms may confound the effect of Delaware incorporation
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staggered boards are different than reincorporation decisions, in that adopt-
ing a staggered board was not possible in the 1990s. This may be true, but
eliminating a staggered board was an option. Firms that chose to eliminate
their staggered board may have been different than firms that retained their
staggered board, implying that Model III or IV applies to the staggered
board case as well as the reincorporation case. This concern can be dealt
with using an instrumental variables specification rather than the subsample
approach, as described below.
Third, even if we assume that there is no omitted variable bias corre-
lated with choice of treatment, that is, E[Y0,i |Di = 1, xiβ,mature] =
E[Y0,i |Di = 0, xi ′β,mature] and E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1, x ′iβ,mature] may
be validly estimated, we may not be particularly interested in this treatment
effect. Old firms are different from the average firm. The effect of stag-
gered boards on this subset of firms may be different from the treatment
effect of policy interest. Suppose a state is considering a law outlawing
staggered boards. In this case, the treatment effect of interest is the ATET,
E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1]. E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 1, x ′iβ,mature] may be a bad
estimate of this quantity. Old firms have already survived and avoided be-
coming part of another firm for a long period. If the primary effect of a
staggered board is to reduce the probability of takeover, then the effect of
a staggered board on firms less likely to get taken over and more likely
to take other firms over should be quite different than the average effect
of a staggered board on all firms with a staggered board. The subsample
approach may therefore give us valid estimates of treatment effects that
have little policy relevance. Future research should discuss the plausibility
of extrapolating the results from population subsamples with valid treatment
effect estimates to the primary population of interest. For example, simi-
lar observable variable values for both the population of interest for policy
and the subsample with valid estimates would enhance the plausibility of
extrapolation (Imbens, 2007a).
Fixed Effects
A similar critique can be directed at another means of identification of
treatment effects—using fixed effects. Fixed-effect specifications identify
the treatment effects of governance from changes in governance within
a given firm. The value of Delaware incorporation, for example, may be
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(Romano, 1985). This mitigates the endogeneity effect, since other firm char-
acteristics are held constant. Generally, we would expect E[Y0,i |Di = 1]
= E[Y0,i |Di = 0], since it is the same firm that is being compared with
itself10 (Chi, 200511). In this case, we obtain an estimate of the treatment
effect of DE reincorporation for these firms, E[Y1,i − Y0,i |reincorporate].
If we want to estimate the effect of having all corporations adopt DE law,
however, then the treatment-effect estimate we obtain may be different
than the treatment effect we desire, which is E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Di = 0]. Firms
that reincorporate have chosen to do so, presumably because they think
that DE law will increase value. Thus, we accurately estimate the treat-
ment effect from a fixed-effects estimation, E[Y1,i − Y0,i |reincorporate] =
E[Y1,i − Y0,i |Y1,i > Y0,i ]. Even if reincorporation is not associated with any
other information, reincorporation studies will find a higher average esti-
mated treatment effect than the one most useful for policy, because the firms
that choose to reincorporate are likely to have a higher average benefit than
firms that do not, even if those firms are similar along every observable di-
mension. This is an example of what Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006)
call essential heterogeneity, where the probability of receiving the treatment
is correlated with the treatment’s effect after controlling for observables.
Instrumental Variables
Assuming that Models I or II do not perfectly describe the governance
data-generating process after conditioning on other variables or examining
subsets of variables, it is extremely difficult to obtain valid treatment-effect
estimates of governance. It is not impossible, however. If some factor, often
called an instrument, changes governance according to Models I or II and
this factor does not impact the value of a firm in any other way, then the
treatment effects of a change in governance can be estimated by focusing on
the changes in governance associated with Model I or Model II like sources.
10. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2002 argue that E[Y0,i |Di = 1] = E[Y0,i |Di =
0], because there are often confounding factors that take place at the same time as
reincorporation announcements that impact the value of firms.
11. Chi uses fixed-effects methods in combination with Granger causality methods to
argue that governance causes changes in value, and not vice versa. While suggestive, the
fact that changes in governance precede changes in value does not prove causality, because
managers with superior information may alter governance before revealing information











104 American Law and Economics Review V10 N1 2008 (90–109)
If, for example, we assume that some random factor called Zi 12 (e.g., a coin
flip) raises the probability that a firm will have a staggered board, then we
can easily estimate the average treatment effect of the coin flip.
Valid instruments are very difficult to find, particularly in the corporate
governance context, as emphasized by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
and Bhagat and Jeffries (2003). The instruments that are valid may suffer
from the weak instruments problem.13 Let us assume, however, that a valid
instrument may be found that does not suffer from the weak instruments
problem. While neither the Daines study of Delaware incorporation nor the
Bebchuk and Cohen study of staggered boards advocate this point, the old
governance choices of a firm may be an instrument for its current governance
choices. That is, the old governance (e.g., staggered board) choice of a firm
may have been effectively random from the perspective of today’s value,
E[Y0,i |historical Di = 1] = E[Y0,i |historical Di = 0] and may still
have an effect on some firms’ governance choices due to inertia. Rather
than simply running OLS on a subsample of mature firms, which assumes
that E[Y0,i |present Di = 1] = E[Y0,i |present Di = 0] and raises the
possibility of confounding exogenous sources of variation in governance
with endogenous sources of variation, such as a firm’s current decision to
stick with or alter its current governance choice, we can use old governance
choices as an instrument (historical Di can be treated as Zi ) for current
governance choices and estimate thereby isolating the exogenous variation
from Model I or II like sources. In other words, the Daines and Bebchuk
and Cohen intuition about the value of focusing on old firms is on target,
but their empirical execution of this intuition (subsample OLS rather than
IV) is flawed. With homogeneous effects of historical governance choices
on current governance choices, we would estimate the treatment effect of a
staggered board or Delaware incorporation, α as follows:
α = {E[Yi |historical Di = 1] − E[Yi |historical Di = 0]}/
{E[Di |historical Di = 1] − E[Di |historical Di = 0}.
12. Again, a discrete instrument is used for simplicity.
13. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1996) show that instrumental variable standard error
estimates are often underestimated. The underestimation is particularly severe when there












Interpreting Corporate Governance Estimates 105
Other studies of governance have also used instruments. For example, let us
assume that the corporate governance instrument used by Black, Jang, and
Kim (2006) in their study of the impact of Korean corporate governance
on firm performance is a valid instrument. (BJK note that Korea introduced
some corporate governance requirements for large firms above a fixed value,
but not for smaller firms below this value. They use this cutoff value to
instrument for governance.)
Instrumental variables and heterogeneity. With homogeneous treatment
effects, a IV (α) estimator provides a valid estimate of the treatment ef-
fect. If the effect of an instrument, such as historical governance choice, is
different for different firms, however, then the IV estimator does not pro-
vide an estimate for the average effect of governance (ATE or ATET) on
performance. That does not mean that instrumental variables cannot yield
interpretable estimates in the presence of heterogeneity, however. As shown
by Imbens and Angrist (1994), under certain assumptions14 IV estimates
with heterogeneous treatment effects can be interpreted as weighted aver-
ages of the individual causal effects, where the weights are determined by
the impact of the instrument on the probability that an individual receives
the treatment. The effect of the treatment for subjects whose probabilities of
receiving treatment are heavily influenced by the instrument receives greater
weight in the IV estimate than other individuals’ effects. Imbens and Angrist
call this parameter the local average treatment effect (LATE).15 In a series
of papers, Heckman, Vytlacil and coauthors (2001, 2005, 2006) expand
these insights in a number of directions. They demonstrate (Vytlacil, 2002)
that the LATE model is equivalent to a selection model under many con-
ditions, that LATE is a discrete approximation to the MTE (Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006) and develop a tech-
nique called local instrumental variables that identifies marginal treatment
effects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006).
Applying these insights to studies of governance yields a number of im-
portant conclusions. Due to essential heterogeneity, firms that would be
14. The most important assumption for defining the meaning of LATE is
monotonicity—the direction of the effect of the instrument on the probability of receiving
treatment is the same for all individuals (Imbens, 2007a).
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greatly affected by staggered boards or Delaware incorporation are likely
to select into their desired treatment even after controlling for other vari-
ables. Using old governance choices as an instrument for governance today,
assuming that the old governance choice is truly exogenous from today’s
perspective, will return the effect of governance for firms whose governance
choices are highly affected by the old governance choice. These firms are
likely to respond less dramatically to a change in staggered board status or
Delaware incorporation than the average firm.16 Thus, the LATE estimator
or its MTE via local IV regression analogue will yield estimates of smaller
magnitude than the ATE or ATET. Similarly, the BJK instrument estimates
the value of governance for companies near the cutoff point for governance
requirements that would not have had governance were it not for the fact that
the law required some of them to. Assuming that there is some correlation
between firm choices and the efficient choice, the MTE (or discrete LATE
approximation) of the required governance for these firms will be lower than
the ATE or ATET.
These LATE or MTE estimates may or may not be the best guides for
policy (Heckman, 2001). The treatment effect for a firm whose staggered
board status is affected by old governance choice (the treatment effect re-
covered by the LATE estimate) is not representative of the treatment effect
for a firm that will change its staggered board status if staggered boards are
outlawed. However, the treatment effect for a firm whose staggered board
status is affected by old governance choice is representative of the treatment
effect for a firm that might change its staggered board status in response to
small subsidy for elimination of a staggered board.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) suggest the following procedure in the
presence of heterogeneity. First, the impact of a proposed policy on the dis-
tribution of a treatment variable should be estimated. For example, if a state
is considering a fee for staggered board, then there will be fewer companies
with staggered boards. The higher the fee, the greater the change in the dis-
tribution. Once this is calculated, Heckman and Vytlacil recommend that the
researcher should calculate the effect of the policy on the outcome of interest
16. This will be true if governance choices are modeled according to Model I or
Model II/Model IV, so long as firm choices of governance have at least some correlation
to the efficient choices. Note that in Model II/Model IV, this correlation can exist but all
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using the MTEs obtained from local instrumental variables estimates. In the
staggered board case, the MTE (marginal treatment effect of staggered
boards on value or takeover probability) for firms whose staggered board
status will shift with the fee provides the best indication of the impact of the
policy on corporate value.
Conclusion
So what does all this modeling effort and talk of heterogeneous treatment
effects law buy us? In my opinion, quite a bit. On the one hand, it forces
us to be more modest in our conclusions. No single paper, even one that
produces valid inferences and overcomes endogeneity, will ever solve the
question of the effect of staggered boards on corporate value. Finding that
staggered boards increase or decrease value for old companies that have not
found it worthwhile to change their staggered board status does not mean
that staggered boards are good for value for all firms or for no firms.
The flip side of this modesty is the possibility of the accumulation of
policy wisdom. Modest demonstrations of local average treatments effects
are much more likely to be convincing than supposed demonstrations of the
global effects of corporate governance. Instead of a never-ending cycle of
papers proving the absolute efficiency or inefficiency of staggered boards
that suffer from the endogeneity of Model III, we may get a series of papers
demonstrating the local treatment effects of staggered boards in various
contexts.
Following Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), scholars and policymakers
should pursue these steps. (1) Identify the type of firms that are to be
affected by a proposed corporate governance intervention. (2) Determine
whether endogeneity concerns along the lines of Models III and IV preclude
the estimation of treatment effects from ordinary regressions of groups of
firms. (3) In the unlikely event that there are no endogeneity concerns, then
policy conclusions can be drawn from these studies, though these conclu-
sions should carefully distinguish different treatment effects and identify the
treatment effect that is most relevant for the group of firms affected by the
proposed intervention. (4) If endogeneity is a concern, then an instrument
that creates random variation in corporate governance choices for these types
of firms should be found. If such an instrument is available, then the LATE
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proposed policy intervention. If not, then more studies are desirable. (5) If
a number of LATE estimates for different subsets of firms reveal a consis-
tent treatment effect pattern for a corporate governance intervention, then
extrapolation from these local-effect estimates to general policies is justified.
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